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THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM(S) 
IN DESCARTES’ “MEDITATIONS” 
AND HUSSERL’S “CRISIS” (Part 2)  1
The main topic of this paper is the mind-body problem. The author analyzes it in the context of Hus-
serlian phenomenology. The key texts for the analysis and interpretation are Descartes’ magnum opus 
“Meditations on the First Philosophy” and Husserl’ last work “The Crisis of European Sciences and 
Transcendental Phenomenology”. The author claims that already in Descartes’ text instead of one 
mind-body problem, one can find two: the ontological mind-body problem (mind-brain relation) and 
conceptual one (“mind” and “body” as concepts). In Descartes’ “Meditations”, the ontological level 
is explicit, while the conceptual level is implicit. In Husserl’s “Crisis”, on the other hand, the situation 
is different: the conceptual level of the problem (as the opposition between transcendental phenome-
nology and natural sciences) is explicit, while the ontological level is implicit. Nevertheless, it seems 
that Husserl has answers to both the “traditional” as well as the “conceptual” mind-body problems.
Keywords: ontological (traditional) mind-body problem, conceptual mind-body problem, transcen-
dental phenomenology, the lived-body (der Leib), Descartes, Husser
Husserl’s “Crisis” in the context of the Cartesian framework
“One can truly say that the idea of nature as a really self-enclosed world of bodies first emerges
 with Galileo. A consequence of this, along with mathematization, which was too quickly 
taken for granted, is [the idea of] a self-enclosed natural causality in which every occurrence 
is determined unequivocally and in advance. Clearly the way is thus prepared for dualism,
which appears immediately afterward in Descartes” [Husserl, 1970: p. 60; Hua VI, S. 61].
1 See the first part of the article in: Leonov, A. (2020). The mind-body problem(s) in Descartes’ 
“Meditations” and Husserl’s “Crisis” (Part 1). Філософська думка, 4, 91–100.
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In this section, I want to clarify the connection between Descartes and his 
two mind-body problems (as I understand them) and Husserl, and how the latter 
dealt with them in his “Crisis”. As in the Descartes’ section, I will start with 
the “traditional mind-body problem” and then will continue with how the “con-
ceptual mind-body problem” can be seen in Husserl’s “Crisis” as well. And what is 
more important — how the latter (conceptual) problem initiated one of the crises, 
as described in Husserl’s last work, namely that between the objective sciences and 
transcendental phenomenology.
2.1. Husserl’s understanding of Descartes 
It’s a famous fact that Husserl understood his phenomenology as the “final form of 
transcendental philosophy” [Husserl, 1970: p. 70; Hua VI, S. 74]. And namely 
Descartes, in his “Meditations”, was not only the founder of the modern philosophy, 
and of “objectivistic rationalism”, but he was also the primal founder (der Urstifter) 
of the whole transcendental realm [Husserl, 1970: p. 73; Hua VI, S. 74-75].
For Husserl, the first two Meditations are the most important ones in Descartes 
(though, he also mistakenly includes there the proof of God from the Third Me di-
ta tion). The general structure of those Meditations he sees in the following way: 
“the progress to the ego cogito, the ego of the cogitationes of the various cogitata” 
(der Gang zum ego cogito, dem Ego der cogitationes, jeweiliger cogitata) [Husserl, 
1970: p. 75; Hua VI, S. 76]. Philosophical knowledge for Descartes is absolutely 
grounded (absolut begründete) knowledge. And its grounds are immediacy, apodic-
ticity, and self-evidence which excludes all conceivable doubt. In general, every step 
of mediate know ledge is also able to achieve this kind of self-evidence [Husserl, 
1970: p. 75; Hua VI, S. 77]. But how is one to achieve this solid foundation of 
knowledge? Car te sian doubt, the very method for it, Husserl calls radical skeptical 
epoché, or simply Car tesian epoché (die Cartesianische epoché), “which places in 
question all his hitherto existing convictions, which forbids in advance any judg-
mental use of them, forbids taking any position as to their validity or invalidity” 
[Husserl, 1970: p. 76; Hua VI, S. 77]. For Husserl, the “Cartesian epoché” puts out 
 of play not only natural sciences, and the life-world (i.e., the world of experience, 
given through senses), but even mathematics with its apodictic self-evidence 
[Husserl, 1970: p. 76; Hua VI, S. 77]  2. 
If every physical object, as well as the objects of the life-world are put out of 
play, then what is left instead? Husserl’s answer is the following: I, the ego, which is 
carrying out the very epoché is left and it is the source of apodictic knowledge  3. 
2 Which appears to be not true. For Descartes, even after his epoché, mathematics still remains 
to be certain and indubitable. See section 1.2. of this paper. Though, Husserl is correct in his 
understanding that mathematics, as according to Descartes, is given primarily to ego, the main 
difference is that in Husserl interpretation of Descartes, mathematical axioms are open to 
doubt and thus, are conceivable of being false and not apodictic. While for Descartes, it is not 
the case, mathematics is still given to ego’s intuition as the very source of the evidence.
3 “I, the ego carrying out the epoché, am not included in its realm of objects but rather–if I actu-
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After the procedure of bracketing, everything, except the ego who brackets, and 
the world itself becomes the mere phenomenon. But nevertheless, “the whole life of 
acts — experiencing, thinking, valuing, etc. — remains, and indeed flows” [Husserl, 
1970: p. 77; Hua VI, S. 79].
The structure of Descartes’ intentionality, according to Husserl, is the following: 
ego cogito — cogitata qua cogitata. Thus, after the epoch , the world itself becomes our 
ideae, which are inseparable from our cogitationes as their cogitata, and I, the ego, 
who performs epoch , is “the only thing that is absolutely indubitable, that excludes 
in principle every possibility of doubt” [Husserl, 1970: p. 78; Hua VI, S. 79-80].
In this sense, I understand the wax example, from the Descartes’ Second Me-
ditation, as a very good example of transcendental phenomenological analysis. Wax, 
in its sensory and imaginary givenness (color, smell, shape, touch etc.), is bracket-
ed, and what is left is “wax” as given to mind (mens) or intellect (intellectus): wax 
as “extended, flexible and changeable”.
Husserl identifies Descartes’ mens with the absolute ego, and the discovery of 
the transcendental realm. But the very mistake of Descartes was that he identified 
his mens (the transcendental realm) with the pure soul  4 (the psychological realm). 
Though, it is only in Descartes that the world itself becomes the phenomenon  5, 
the latter, when still trying to find out the nature of the ego, was mistakenly identi-
fied with the soul (animus). Thus, in Descartes there is a confusion of two different 
attitudes: the transcendental phenomenological and the psychological. Therefore, 
according to Husserl, the world itself is treated phenomenologically as a phenome-
non and at the same time as objectively existing. For Husserl, that which grounds 
objective knowledge (including philosophy) cannot itself be grounded within it. 
What brackets the world itself (and thus it becomes a phenomenon) and is the source 
of meaning about it (intentionality)  6 cannot simultaneously be the subject-matter 
in that which is bracketed  7. In this sense, the soul is bracketed in the epoché and 
can be investigated only as a phenomenon, given to the ego (mens)  8. Therefore, the 
ally carry out the epoché radically and universally–am excluded in principle. I am necessary as 
the one carrying it out. It is precisely herein that I find just the apodictic ground I was seeking, 
the one which absolutely excludes every possible doubt” [Husserl, 1970: p. 77; Hua VI, S. 81].
4 [Husserl, 1970: p. 80: Hua VI, S. 82]
5 [Husserl, 1970: p. 80; Hua VI, S. 82]
6 According to Husserl, one cannot doubt “a true presentation and treatment of the subject of 
intentionality [in Descartes]” [Husserl, 1970: p. 83; Hua VI, S. 85].
7 “The ego is not a residuum of the world but is that which is absolutely apodictically posited; and this 
is made possible only through the epoché, only through the “bracketing” of the total world-validi ty; 
and it is the only positing thus made possible. The soul, however, is the residuum of a previous abstrac-
tion of the pure physical body. … But abstraction (and we must not overlook this) occurs not in 
the epoché but in the natural scientist’s or psychologist’s way of looking at things, on the natural 
ground of the world as pregiven and taken for granted” [Husserl, 1970: p. 79-80; Hua VI, S. 81].
8 As Husserl puts it: “…the mens, which at first stood by itself in the epoché and functioned as 
the absolute ground of knowledge, grounding the objective sciences (or, universally speak-
ing, philosophy), appeared at the same time to be grounded along with everything else as a legit-
imate subject matter within the sciences, i.e., in psychology. Descartes does not make clear to 
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transcendentalism of Descartes still remains “psychologically adulterated” [Hus-
serl, 1970: p. 83; Hua VI, S. 86].
Now, let’s look at Husserl’s understanding of Descartes’ mens. According to 
Husserl, after the Cartesian epoché, nothing is left: the sensible world as well as the 
living-body  9 are put out of play, which allows Descartes to define the ego as “mens 
sive animus sive intellectus” [Husserl, 1970: p. 79; Hua VI, S. 81]. Now, let’s recall 
the ambiguity of the notion of intellect in Descartes himself, precisely, a difference 
of the use of this notion in the Second and the Sixth Meditations. 
It’s true that in the Second Meditation, Descartes says “I am, then, in the strict 
sense only a thing that thinks; that is, I am mind (mens), or intelligence (animus), 
or intellect (intellectus), or reason (ratio)…”, and finds it necessarily true [Descartes, 
2008: p. 18; 1957: p. 27]. But does this mean that he has no sensory perceptions 
after bracketing? Here is how Descartes saw himself and the world after the epo-
ché: “… it is also the same I who has sensory perceptions, or is aware of bodily 
things as it were through the senses. For example, I am now seeing light, hearing a 
noise, feeling heat  10. But I am asleep, so all this is false. Yet, I certainly seem to see, 
to hear, and to be warmed. This cannot be false; what is called “having a sensory 
perception” is strictly just this, and in this is restricted sense of the term it is simply 
thinking” [Descartes, 2008: p. 19; 1957: p. 29]. 
This passage makes it abundantly clear that here is the case of Descartes’ inten-
tionality (which Husserl himself was really sure of), and the “sensory perceptions” 
can be understood in its terms as well, i.e. as cogitata of ego’s cogitationes. From 
this it follows that Husserl’s understanding of Descartes’ intellect is much closer to 
the Cartesian Sixth Meditation (as a kind of information-processing tool with nothing 
subjective as its companion), rather than to the Second. Therefore, even though in 
the Second Meditation, Descartes identifies mens with animus, the previous example 
clearly shows that here we still have mens (or intellect) as the transcendental realm, 
rather than the psychological one. I think that this is really what Descartes meant to 
convey through this example. 
2.2. Husserl’s answer to the traditional mind-body problem
According to Husserl, Descartes failed to follow the transcendental lead and thus, 
the dualism of nature (die Natur) and mind (der Geist)  11 was born, where the latter 
himself that the ego, his ego deprived of its worldly character [entweltlicht] through the epoché, 
in whose functioning cogitationes the world has all the ontic meaning it can ever have for him, 
cannot possibly turn up as subject matter in the world, since everything that is of the world 
derives its meaning precisely from these functions–including, then, one’s own psychic being, 
the ego in the usual sense” [Husserl, 1970: p. 81-82; Hua VI, S. 83-84].
 9 The discussion of the living-body in Husserl and Descartes, see in the next section.
10  Italics are mine. — A.L.
11 In the English translation of Husserl’s “Crisis”, der Geist is mostly translated as spirit (though 
sometimes a reference to “mind” and “mental” is made as well). But the notion “spirit” itself 
has cultural and religious connotations. Is it the case in Descartes in his first two Meditations, 
where is still no proof of God, and which Husserl conceives as the most important Medita-
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was identified with the soul (or better, psyche) and thus, a way for a new naturalistic 
psychology was suggested [Husserl, 1970: p. 62; Hua VI, S. 63]  12. 
Nature appears to be “in its ‘true being-in-itself’ mathematical” [Husserl, 
1970: p. 54; Hua VI, S. 54]. Such an understanding of nature started with Galileo 
and clearly corresponds to the Cartesian res extensa  13. As was shown earlier, the 
lat ter is a physical-mathematical concept, which expresses the meaning of the 
natural sciences. And both in the Cartesian epoché, and in the natural scientific 
attitude, the life-world (“the forgotten meaning-fundament of natural science” 
[Hus serl, 1970: p. 48; Hua VI, S. 48]) is bracketed (in the former) or forgotten (in 
the latter). 
According to Husserl, the life-world (Lebenswelt), is “the only real world, the one 
that is actually given through perception, that is ever experienced and expe rien-
ceable…” [Husserl, 1970: p. 49; Hua VI, S. 49]. This world is the world of the direct 
intuition (whose object is prescientifically intuited nature). To the life-world belong 
not only physical objects (Körper), but also our “bodily [leiblich], personal (perso-
nale) way of being (Seinsweise)” [Husserl, 1970: p. 50; Hua VI, S. 50]. The latter 
distinction requires serious attention, in so far as, in my opinion, it is Husserl’s 
direct way of approaching the traditional mind-body problem.
Thus, Husserl distinguishes between physical-mathematical objects (der Kör-
per) and the living-body (or body as lived) (der Leib). Der Körper clearly express 
what Descartes meant by res extensa: physical bodies, which are the subject-matter 
of pure mathematics. Roughly, these are bodies as given from the third-person of 
view. Der Leib expresses the body as given to me in sense perception: my living-body. 
Thus, der Leib means one’s own bodily givenness from the first-person perspective. 
tions? According to Husserl’s interpretation, the Cartesian epoché, through which Descartes 
got to his mens is the first attempt to do transcendental phenomenology where everything, in-
cluding the sensible-world is bracketed (where everything cultural, personal and religious is 
bracketed as well). The same goes for Husserlian transcendental phenomenology in his Ideas I. 
And the very Descartes’ mistake, as according to Husserl, was the identification of the trans-
cendental mens (mind) with the psychological animus (soul), and therefore, a substitution of 
transcendental phenomenology for the objective naturalistic psychology. In the latter, one can 
also find nothing “spiritual” in the given sense. Thus, translation of Geist as “spirit” appears 
to be as a methodological mistake, which contradicts to the very Husserlian approach to Des-
cartes. It also seems that “soul” (die Seele) Husserl uses in a non-religious sense as well, which 
is indicated by Husserl’s binding this notion to the natural scientific realm (psychology).
12 “Naturally, as soon as Descartes had proclaimed the idea of a rational philosophy and the di-
vision of nature and spirit, a new psychology was an immediate requirement, and it already 
made its appearance in Descartes’s contemporary, Hobbes. It was, as we have already indicat-
ed, a psychology of a sort completely unknown to earlier times, designed concretely as a psy-
chophysical anthropology in the rationalistic spirit” [Husserl, 1970: p. 62; Hua VI, S. 63].
13 “One can truly say that the idea of nature as a really self-enclosed world of bodies first emerg-
es with Galileo. A consequence of this, along with mathematization, which was too quickly 
taken for granted, is [the idea of] a self-enclosed natural causality in which every occurrence is 
determined unequivocally and in advance. Clearly the way is thus prepared for dualism, which 
appears immediately afterward in Descartes” [Husserl, 1970: p. 60; Hua VI, S. 61].
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Ego communicates with Körper through Leib. This communication takes place 
through the kinesthesis: “… primarily through seeing, hearing, etc.; and of course 
other modes of the ego belong to this (for example, lifting, carrying, pushing, and 
the like)” [Husserl, 1970: p. 108; Hua VI, S. 110]. According to Husserl, der Leib 
has a mediating function between the ego and the physical reality. Schematically, it 
is the following: ego — living-body (der Leib) — physical bodies (der Körper). While 
speaking of the living-body, Husserl uses the metaphor of the “organ”: it is through 
kinesthetically functioning living-body the ego holds sway (waltet) and immediately 
communicates with the environment [Husserl, 1970: p. 107; Hua VI, S. 109].
Namely the life-world and the living-body Husserl sees as missing in both 
Ga lileo and later in De scartes, who inherited the mathematical view of nature 
from the former. In Husserl’s interpretation, after the “psychologization” of the mens, 
De scartes substitutes his just discovered transcendental realm for the natural-scien-
tific (psychology), that is the way of res extensa. 
But I think the situation is different: the body as a physical-mathematical object 
(Husserlian Körper) is indeed bracketed in the Cartesian epoché, but the body as 
lived (as in its “sensory perceptions” from the first-person point of view: which feels 
heat, sees light, hears noise etc.), that is, as my body (or meum corpus) is not  14.
In the Second Meditation, Descartes anticipated the living-body from the point 
of view of the transcendental mens: even if there is no material body (as res exten-
sa), there still are the sensory perceptions, as if the body existed as my body. (One 
can be really a brain in a vat, or even the software program in the Matrix, but nev-
ertheless one would still sense and feel his body as his own, as lived, though it is not 
existent at all).
In the Sixth Meditation, the situation is modified: there is no doubt that my 
material body (corpus) exists, but here one can see that body here can be treated as 
something biological, namely as flesh: a mix of blood, organs, muscles, bones etc. 
That is, in the Second Meditation, the body can be viewed transcendentally: as the 
merely cogitata of my own cogitatitiones (even when the real (material) body is put 
out of play). But in the Sixth Meditation, the view is more realistic: the material 
body (corpus) exists, but the ego is not just a captain on the ship (or intellect in its 
second meaning (as an information-processing tool), but an active participant of it 
or that, which holds sway (if to speak in Husserlian term), — the material body 
(corpus) is lived in and from its union with the ego, and thus can be understood as 
the living-body (der Leib) in the Husserlian sense. Thus, schematically, it can be 
seen like this: mens — meum corpus — corpus (res extensa)  15.
14  Also, let’s recall the important Cottingham’s note regarding the ambiguity in Descartes’ usage 
of corpus in the Sixth Meditation: “The Latin term corpus as used here by Descartes is ambiguous 
as between ‘body’ (i.e. corporeal matter in general) and ‘the body’ (i.e. this particular body of 
mine). The French version preserves the ambiguity” [Descartes, 2008: p. 54]. 
15 Now, we can clearly see that in Cottingham’s suggestion, Descartes’ “corporeal matter in 
general” directly corresponds to Husserl’s Körper, and “this particular body of mine” — to 
Husserl’s Leib.
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It seems that Husserl connects the living-body to the life-world. In Husserl’s 
understanding, Cartesian epoché excludes the life-world and the living-body alto-
gether. I tend to agree with the exclusion of the former, but disagree with that of the 
latter. Thus, it seems that Descartes’ living-body still can be understood transcen-
dentally as cogitata of one’s own cogitationes (in the Second Meditation), as well as in 
the more realistic approach, i.e., as Leib (in the Sixth Meditation) 16.
I understand Husserl’s discussion of the living-body, as a kind of “phenome-
nological ‘third way’” of dealing with the traditional mind-body problem, as op-
posed to the existence of just immaterial mind and material body.
Descartes’ case is more difficult: it seems, that his own explicit solution to the 
ontological (traditional) mind-body problem lies in the study of the brain (or the 
neuroscientific approach, to speak in modern terms). The discussion of “sensory 
perception” after the Cartesian epoché in the Second Meditation, and of “meum 
corpus” in the Sixth Meditation, can now be seen as a direct anticipation of the 
living-body discussion in Husserl.
2.3. Husserl on the “conceptual” mind-body problem 
Let’s recall what was meant by the “conceptual” mind-body problem. In my un-
derstanding, Descartes’ res cogitans, or mens, is a phenomenological concept, 
which opens the door to the dimension of phenomenological meaning. On the other 
hand, res extensa is a concept of something physical, which is the subject-matter of 
pure mathematics, and thus, expresses the meaning of the natural sciences. Thus, 
the essence of the conceptual “mind-body” problem can be seen as the gap between 
phenomenological meaning and that of the natural sciences. 
Husserl’ analysis in his “Crisis”, clearly showed Descartes as the “primal 
founder” (der Urstifter) of transcendental phenomenology and a discoverer of 
trans cendental subjectivity (expressed by his mens or ego). Now it can be clearly seen 
that what was meant under the conflict of meanings in Descartes can be understood 
as the conflict between the meaning of the transcendental phenomenology (“trans-
cendental subjectivism”) and that of the natural sciences (“physicalistic objectiv-
ism”)  17. Although Husserl recognized the origins of the transcendental phenome-
nology in Descartes; he failed to recognize the origins of one of the “crises of the 
European sciences”  18 in the Cartesian metaphysics. This “crisis” can be clearly seen 
in Descartes’ distinguishing between res cogitans and res extensa. Especially, giv-
en that Descartes greatly influenced Husserl’s transcendental phenomenological 
16  From this it could follow a suggestion that in so far as we have a real anticipation of Husser-
lian Leib already in Descartes’ Sixth Meditation, where material objects exist, there can be 
born a suggestion that implicitly, there is also an anticipation of the life-world as well and res 
cogitans and res extensa methodologies are in a way two different approaches to one “object”, 
i.e., the life-world itself. But so far, I find it too speculative and leave it aside.
17  “[N]euztlichen Gegensatzes zwischen Physikalistischem Objektivismus und transzendenta-
lem Subjektivismus“ [Hua VI, S. 18].
18 The other one is a gap between the life-world and the natural sciences, which started with Ga li leo.
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project per se  19, and also is considered in the “Crisis” as the first one to get to 
the dimension of transcendental subjectivity.
But now, let’s try to see why Husserl failed to see it. It seems that the problem 
lies in the mixing of, and trying to balance between, two different phenomenolog-
ical approaches as discussed in his “Crisis”. The first one is developed in his Ideas 
I and is called the transcendental phenomenology. In that work, Husserl clearly fol-
lows Descartes in his Cartesian epoché, while trying to fix what Descartes got 
wrong [Husserl, 1970: p. 155; Hua VI, S. 157-158]. The second one is the life-world 
approach, which is clearly incompatible with the “Cartesian way” as developed in 
his Ideas I. So, at first, let’s try to clarify what makes transcendental phenomenol-
ogy transcendental. 
Since Descartes is considered its Urstifter, let’s look at what makes his phi-
losophy transcendental. I agree with Husserl that the first two Meditations are 
enough to grasp fully the importance of the Cartesian phenomenological meth-
od. In those Meditations Descartes “brackets” the whole sensible world in order 
to find its essential structures. As it was noted before, I find the wax analysis in the 
Second Meditation to be a very good example of transcendental phenomenologi-
cal analysis. Wax as given to the senses is bracketed (in the “Cartesian epoché”), 
and only its essential structure as given to mind (mens) or intellect is grasped, and 
it is wax as “extended, flexible and changeable”. Thus, after its bracketing as a 
physical object (as contingent in its essence), wax became a phenomenon (as inten-
tional object), where we got its essential structure (which is not contingent, but 
necessary). 
The same strategy was taken by Husserl in his Ideas I, where he described 
transcendental phenomenology (as a “descriptive science of essential Being”) 
[Husserl, 2012: p. 3; Hua III/1, S. 6], as attained through phenomenological ep-
oché, which is about disconnecting and putting out of play everything that “con-
cerns spatio-temporal existence (Dasein)” [Husserl, 2012: p. 59; Hua III/1, S. 65]. 
Thus, all sensory givenness is subject to bracketing as contingent, and that’s the only 
means by which we can get to what is essential, and thus, necessary  20. Therefore, 
19  For example, Husserl’s confession of this in his “Cartesian Meditations” [Husserl, 1960: p. 1; 
Hua I, S. 43] or Cartesian cogito as his starting-point in his “Ideas I” [Husserl, 2012: p. 53, 64; 
Hua III/1, S. 58-59, 70].
20 For example, as Husserl puts it in “Ideas I”: “The thesis of my pure Ego and its personal life, 
which is ‘necessary’ and plainly indubitable, thus stands opposed to the thesis of the world which is 
‘contingent’. All corporeally given thing-like entities can also not be, no corporeally given experi-
encing can also not be: that is the essential law, which defines this necessity and that contingen-
cy” [Husserl, 2012: p. 88; Hua III/1, S. 98] Regarding the contingency of the “physical truth”, 
see [Husserl, 2012: p. 90-91; Hua III/1, S. 99-100]. 
Or through his appeal to the possible-worlds semantics: “…‘the real world’, as it is called, the 
correlate of our factual experience, then presents itself as a special case of various possible 
worlds and non-worlds, which on their side, are no other than correlates of the essentially 
possible variations of the idea ‘empirical consciousness’, with its more or less empirical con-
nections” [Husserl, 2012: p. 91; Hua III/1, S. 100-101].
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transcendental phenomenology in both Descartes and Husserl is about grasping 
(through the epoché or reduction what appears to be contingent) what is essential.
If physics and mathematics are suspended, then what is the source of the evi-
dence of what is essential? For both Descartes and Husserl, it is definitely I, the ego. 
Namely the latter is the ultimate source of the true and apodictic Being. For De-
scartes, in his “Meditations”, it is called mens or intellect; for Husserl in his  “Ideas I”, 
it is the absolute consciousness or transcendental ego. In short, for both thinkers it is 
the ego after the epoch  procedure  21. 
For Husserl, physical-mathematical meaning (or that of the natural sciences) 
is grounded  22 upon the meaning of transcendental subjectivity. The latter is the pri-
mary apodictic source for the objective sciences  23. Thus, Husserl’s answer to the 
“conceptual” mind-body problem would be in the constant going back to the ulti-
mate source of the objective sciences: transcendental subjectivity. The former (ob-
jective sciences) must be always given and clarified through the latter (transcen-
dental subjectivity).
21 In the §26 of “Crisis”, Husserl is very explicit about this: “I myself use the word “transcendental” 
in the broadest sense for the original motif, discussed in detail above, which through Descartes 
confers meaning upon all modern philosophies, the motif which, in all of them, seeks to come 
to itself, so to speak –seeks to attain the genuine and pure form of its task and its systematic 
development. It is the motif of inquiring back into the ultimate source of all the formations of 
knowledge, the motif of the knower’s reflecting upon himself and his knowing life in which all 
the scientific structures that are valid for him occur purposefully, are stored up as acquisitions, 
and have become and continue to become freely available. Working itself out radically, it is the 
motif of a universal philosophy which is grounded purely in this source and thus ultimately 
grounded. This source bears the title I-myself, with all of my actual and possible knowing life 
and, ultimately, my concrete life in general. The whole transcendental set of problems circles 
around the relation of this, my ‘I’ — the ‘ego’ — to what it is at first taken for granted to be–my 
soul–and, again, around the relation of this ego and my conscious life to the world of which I 
am conscious and whose true being I know through my own cognitive structures” [Husserl, 
1970: p. 97-98; Hua VI, S. 100-101].
22 In his critique of Kant, Husserl confesses: “Kant never permitted himself to enter the vast 
depths of the Cartesian fundamental investigation, and his own set of problems never caused 
him to seek in these depths for ultimate groundings [Italics are mine. — A.L.] and decisions. … 
a transcendental philosophy is the more genuine, and better fulfills its vocation as philosophy, 
the more radical it is and, finally, that it comes to its actual and true existence, to its actual and 
true beginning, only when the philosopher has penetrated to a clear understanding of himself 
as the subjectivity functioning as primal source…
It is a philosophy which, in opposition to prescientific and scientific objectivism, goes back to 
knowing subjectivity as the primal locus of all objective formations of sense and ontic validities, 
[Italics are mine. — A.L.] undertakes to understand the existing world as a structure of sense 
and validity, and in this way seeks to set in motion an essentially new type of scientific attitude 
and a new type of philosophy” [Husserl, 1970: p. 99; Hua VI, S. 102].
23 As Husserl puts it: “the objective-scientific method rests upon a never questioned, deeply con-
cealed subjective ground whose philosophical elucidation will for the first time reveal the true 
meaning of the accomplishments of positive science and, correctively, the true ontic meaning 
of the objective world — precisely as a transcendental-subjective meaning” [Husserl, 1970: 
p. 100; Hua VI, S. 103].
126 ISSN 2522-9338. Філософська думка. 2020. № 5
Andrii LEONOV
As we have seen before, for Descartes, the situation is pretty similar: the phys-
ical-mathematical meaning, as expressed by res extensa is to be given through 
the phenomenological meaning as expressed by res cogitans. That is, the essence of 
the physical things is to be given through the transcendental mens. 
Therefore, both Descartes and Husserl didn’t deny the importance of the ob-
jective sciences. Transcendental phenomenology is supposed to be the scientific 
enterprise itself. Therefore, for them, the key point is that natural sciences are se-
condary for us, as opposed to the transcendental phenomenology, which is primary. 
In alliance with our suggestion of Descartes’ solution of the “conceptual” mind-
body problem, we can say that transcendental phenomenology and the objective scien-
ces, despite their differences, must form a scientific union, in which the former is 
primary for us, as opposed to the latter, which is secondary.
Now, it will be easier to understand why Husserl didn’t recognize the origins 
of one of the “crises” (that is, the opposition between the transcendental phenome-
nology and natural sciences) as stemming from Descartes’ “Meditations”. As it was 
noted, the other important “crisis” in Husserl’s last work was the fundamental gap 
between the life-world (primarily a prescientific sensible world) and the natural 
scien ces. One can say that actually the main topic of “Crisis” is the discussion of 
the life- world itself. It is here that I see a major shift of the phenomenological at ti-
tude in Husserl.
Thus, at the same time, the life-world is also considered to be the ground  24 or 
the “grounding soil [der gründende Boden]”  25 of objective-scientific knowledge. 
Today, Descartes is blamed for not seeing the fact that “just as the sensible world, 
that of everyday life, is the cogitatum of sensing cogitationes, so the scientific world 
is the cogitatum of scientific cogitationes”  26, and Husserl confesses himself that in 
his “Ideas I”, while following and developing the Cartesian way of doing transcen-
dental epoché (or Cartesian epoché), though one gets to the transcendental ego “in 
one leap”, this ego remains “empty of content”. And that’s not the end of the 
story: one can easily fall back into the natural attitude from the very beginning 
[Husserl, 1970: p. 155; Hua VI, S. 158]. Therefore, our primary scientific start-
ing-point has to be the life-world.
That being said, one can see Husserl’s trial of balancing between two sources 
for doing phenomenology (i.e., transcendental subjectivity and the life-world) 
ended up in the confusion of two completely incompatible phenomenological ap-
proaches: the “Cartesian” transcendental phenomenology (which brackets everything 
24 “If we have made our contrast with all necessary care, then we have two different things: life-
world and objective-scientific world, though of course [they are] related to each other. The 
knowledge of the objective-scientific world is “grounded” in the self-evidence of the life-
world” [Husserl, 1970: p. 130; Hua VI, S. 133].
25 “The concrete life-world, then, is the grounding soil [der gründende Boden] of the ‘scientifically 
true’ world and at the same time encompasses it in its own universal concreteness” [Husserl, 
1970: p. 131; Hua VI, S. 134].
26 [Husserl, 1970: p. 90; Hua VI, S. 92]
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sensible, spatio-temporal and relative  27) and the life-world approach (which is indeed 
about what is sensible, corporeal and relative). Thus, the meaning of the “transcen-
dental” is also misleadingly changed: the “Cartesian way” presupposes (through the 
“Cartesian epoché”) getting from factual (empirical) to the “essential Being”, which 
is “irreal (or ‘ideal’)”, and thus “… phenomenology should be a theory of essential 
Being, dealing not with real, but with transcendentally reduced phenomena”  28, 
while the life-world approach is about dealing with what is real, and therefore means 
rather a realistic approach, instead of transcendental in the latter’s original sense.
Conclusion
In this paper, the main object of the investigation was the mind-body problem, 
conceived in a two-fold way: the traditional (ontological) and the conceptual. Special 
emphasis was put on Descartes’ latter problem, which I see as the foundation of 
the opposition between transcendental phenomenology and the natural sciences 
(as one of the “crises” described in Husserl’s last work).
It was shown that Descartes, the originator of these problems, as well as 
Husserl, had answers to the both of them. Descartes’ approach to the traditional 
mind-body problem was explicitly the neuroscientific one, while implicitly, it seems, 
Descartes anticipated the living-body (der Leib), as developed in Husserl’s phe-
nomenology later on. Regarding the conceptual mind-body problem, it seemed 
that Descartes saw the phenomenological meaning (that of mens) and that of nat-
ural sciences (expressed by res extensa) in their unity, where for us, phenomenology 
is primary, while natural sciences — secondary.
The same goes for Husserl: in his “Crisis”, the phenomenological “third way” 
solution for the ontological mind-body problem is to be achieved through the de-
scription of the living-body (der Leib); the opposition between transcendental phe-
nomenology and the natural sciences (as stemming from Descartes’ conceptual 
mind-body problem) can be dealt with through constantly going back to the foun-
dation of the natural sciences — transcendental subjectivity. Thus, Husserl’s so-
lution to the conceptual mind-body problem can be understood in alliance with 
Descartes as well.
It became clear through the development of this work that two crises are in-
dependent of each other. The same goes for two different phenomenological ap-
proaches: the Cartesian way (originally as transcendental phenomenology) and 
the life-world approach. They appear to be not only independent of each other, but 
also completely incompatible.
27 Including culture, history, men, person, moral custom, society, law, religion etc. [Husserl, 2012: 
p. 96, 111, 117, 119; Hua III/1, S. 107, 122, 129, 132]. In general, everything related to natural 
and spiritual sciences (Geisteswissenschaft) must be bracketed: “Therewith, all the sciences 
natural and mental (alle Natür and Geisteswissenschaften), with the entire know ledge they 
accumulated, undergo disconnexion as sciences which require for their development the nat-
ural standpoint (natürlichen Einstellung)” [Husserl, 2012: p. 111; Hua III/1, S. 122].
28  [Husserl, 2012: p. 4: Hua III/1, S. 6].
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From the point of view of the transcendental phenomenology, the life-world is 
contingent and dubitable (as given through senses), and thus is relative, which enables 
us to bracket it. Therefore, the motivation for the transcendental phenomenology 
to be critical stems from the contingency and dubitability of sensuous givenness. On 
the other hand, sensuous givenness is primary for the life-world phenomenology.
Husserl’s attempt to balance between these two approaches ended up with 
con fusion of the very meaning of the “transcendental”.
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